. A candidate must receive 270 out of a possible 538 electoral votes in order to win the Electoral College. A Procedural Guide to the Electoral College, http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/electoralcollege/procedural_guide.html (last visited January 15, 2012) . This number is derived from the combination of three different sources. First, the U.S. Census figures determine the number of congressional representatives each state can have. 2 U.S.C. § 2a . Second, 3 U.S.C. § 3 (West 2011) says that " [t] he number of electors shall be equal to the number of Senators and Representatives to which the several States are by law entitled at the time when the President and Vice President to be chosen come into office." Third, the Twenty-Third Amendment of the Constitution grants presidential electors to the District of Columbia, but no more than the least populous state has. U.S. CONST. amend. XXIII.
If the NPVC becomes enacted, the chief election official in each member state will add up the total number of national popular votes for each candidate, and the state's certifying official will then appoint that state's slate of electors to the winner of the national popular vote. 8 Member states are permitted to withdraw from the NPVC, but cannot do so after July 20 in the year of a presidential election. 9 As this comment will later explain, each state is entitled to choose how it wants to allocate its electoral votes. Thus, constitutional scrutiny of the NPVC centers on the manner in which it will be formed, not whether each state has the individual capacity to change its method of allocation.
Part II of this comment will discuss the formation of the Electoral College, the roles that both state and federal governments play in the election of the president, and the emergence of the NPVC as an alternative to a constitutional amendment. Part III surveys the history of the Compact Clause, which would be implicated by enactment of the NPVC. Part IV takes a detailed look at the principles of federalism that are inherent in the Electoral College, explores the roles of presidential electors, and concludes that under existing Compact Clause precedent, the NPVC does not require Congressional consent in order to be effective.
II. Electoral College Background
Article II of the Constitution requires each state legislature to define a method to appoint electors to vote for the President. 10 In McPherson v. Blacker, a late nineteenth century case, the Supreme Court confirmed that state legislatures have this plenary power under Article II when it 8 National Popular Vote, supra note 7. 9 The NPVC states that it "shall govern the appointment of presidential electors in each member state in any year in which this agreement is, on July 20, in effect in states cumulatively possessing a majority of the electoral votes. " Id. thought Pinckney's fears were exaggerated, and ensured delegates that even though groups of voters might control the popular will in small districts, "the general voice of the State is never influenced by such artifices." 18 The delegates to the Convention had originally decided that Congress would elect the president, but Morris expressed his opposition to that plan, explaining that the president might turn out to be a puppet of the legislature, leading to " [c] DIRECT VOTE ALTERNATIVE 21 (Murray Printing Co. 1981) . 21 MADISON, supra note 14, at 525. 22 Id. at 524-25. Eldridge Gerry, though, feared that "one set of men dispersed through the Union & acting in Concert" would always be able to determine the president, as they could override " [t] he ignorance of the people" under a direct national vote. Id. at 50. 23 Id. would produce a better and more informed decision than the people themselves. 49 Because the electors would not formally convene together but vote only within their respective states, they would be less exposed to the "heats and ferments" of being in the physical presence of each other. 50 Hamilton also believed that, because the electors and the state legislatures' appointing them were among the "enlightened and respectable citizens," the electors would naturally direct towards the most accomplished candidate for the presidency." 51 However, with the introduction of political parties, the hope that the delegates would provide a free, unconstrained choice was rapidly done away with. 52 "Party discipline" was seen as a way of avoiding an executive branch that had a president and vice president from different parties. 53 A lack of "party discipline" was partly responsible for the result of the 1796 presidential election, which produced John Adams, a 3285-86 (1942) . 71 See ZIMMERMAN, supra note 65, at 39 ("Although the Eleventh Amendment prohibits a citizen of one state to sue another state without its consent, a citizen can challenge a compact or its execution in a state or national court against an individual or in a proceeding to prevent a government officer from enforcing a compact." (citing Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908)). 72 Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433, 440 ("But where Congress has authorized the States to enter into a cooperative agreement, and where the subject matter of that agreement is an appropriate subject for congressional legislation, the consent of Congress transforms the States' agreement into federal law under the Compact Clause."). 73 See ZIMMERMAN, supra note 65, at 35. 74 Id. at 34. 75 Id. at 34-35 (referencing the Interstate Commission on Crime and regional governors' conferences as examples of how some compacts are now formed through "ad hoc arrangements").
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The Compact Clause has its roots in the colonial era, when the colonies set up joint commissions to deal with boundary disputes. shall enter into any treaty, confederation or alliance whatever between them, without the consent of the united States in congress assembled, specifying accurately the purposes for which the same is to be entered into, and how long it shall continue."). Congressional consent under the Articles of Confederation was different in that the congressional body itself was different-a unicameral one instead of the bicameral one that is in place today. ZIMMERMAN, supra note 65, at 33. 81 ZIMMERMAN, supra note 65, at 33. 82 Wharton v. Wise, 153 U. S. 155, 163-165 (1894) . The Court also explained that even though the compact was entered into before the Constitution, it was still valid, as it did not conflict in any way with the Constitution. Id. at 167-68 (1894).
Interstate compacts remained permissible under the Constitution, but states could no longer make treaties or alliances with other states or nations. 83 As Michael Greve explains, the "broad and unqualified" language in the Compact Clause and the other Article I, Section 10 restrictions on the States reflects "the Founders' special concern over all-not just some-state agreements." 84 The Compact Clause's placement in Article I, Section 10 of the Constitution is highly relevant to a determination of the Framers' original intent with the Clause, as it sits alongside numerous other powers prohibited to the States. 85 The Federalist is fairly sparse in its discussion of the Compact Clause, lumping it in with a discussion of a number of other clauses that were "copied" from the Articles of Confederation. However, he did not determine that the agreement was flat out impermissible, but that it had to be "made under the supervision of the United States," thus giving some meaning to the congressional consent requirement in the 91 Id. 92 Id. ("Uniformly, the prohibitions and negatives are directed against classes of state laws with a manifest detrimental effect on sister states. As Madison might have put it, the Convention sought to arrest factionalism at the borders."). See also, Gillian Metzger, Congress, Article IV, and Interstate Relations, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1468 , 1500 -01 (2007 . ("What nonetheless remains notable about Section 10 is that it represents an express articulation of the interstate model also evident in the other constitutional interstate provisions--that is, prohibitions on the states that are independently binding but subject to ultimate congressional control.") 93 See Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. 540, 578 (1840) (plurality opinion). 94 39 U.S. 540. 95 Id. at 578. 96 Id. ("Such conflicting exercises of the same power would not be well calculated to preserve respect abroad or union at home."). 97 Id. 99 Greve, supra note 84, at 298 ("The text of the Clause, of course, treats state agreements with foreign powers on a par with state-to-state agreements. If it compels a rigid interpretation in the foreign dimension, it compels an equally rigid, forbidding interpretation in its domestic dimension."). 100 Florida v. Georgia, 58 U.S. 478, 494 (1854). 101 Id. ("This provision is obviously intended to guard the rights and interests of the other States, and to prevent any compact or agreement between any two States, which might affect injuriously the interest of the others."). 102 Id.
Constitution
103 Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503, 519 (1893). The Court also used this case as an opportunity to clear up the distinction between compacts and agreements, explaining that it "d[id] not perceive any difference in the meaning, except that the word 'compact' is generally used with reference to more formal and serious engagements than is usually implied in the term 'agreement'"). 452, 457 (1978) . However, the signatories "retain[ed] complete control over all legislation and administrative action affecting the rate of tax, the composition of the tax allowed the Commission to conduct audits for member states and to use compulsory process in the courts of member states. 114 The states that formed the Commission had unilateral exit rights from the compact, and could exercise those rights by enacting a repealing statute. 115 In concluding that the compact at stake did not require congressional consent, the Court's determined that the member states were not collectively creating a new power that they did not already have individually.
116
Though much of the majority opinion in U.S. Steel did not articulate the circumstances that would need to occur in order for the Compact Clause to be violated, the Court opened up the possibility that such a circumstance might be present if the Commission had definite authority to impose punishments. 117 The Court explained that the compact granted the Commission, in its auditing capacity, the power to require individual attendance and production of documents.
118
But because the procedure for enforcing that requirement would have to be conducted in the same manner as it would if acted upon by a random auditing agent, the Court concluded that the Commission had no exclusive punishing power and thus was not providing the member states with a benefit that they did not already have. 119 After U.S. Steel, the constitutionality of an base (including the determination of the components of taxable income), and the means and methods of determining tax liability and collecting any taxes determined to be due." Id. The interstate coordination required for the enactment of the NPVC is akin to an assurance game. 145 While the "we can do this unilaterally, so doing it collectively shouldn't matter" argument is plausible, it becomes somewhat flawed when picked apart. A state would have no incentive to allocate its electors to the national winner without knowing that other states [T] he very creation of the Compact sets it apart from separate state action. The Compact did not become effective in any of the ratifying States until at least seven States had adopted it. Thus, unlike reciprocal legislation, the Compact provided a means by which a State could assure itself that a certain number of other States would go along before committing itself to an apportionment formula. U.S. Steel v. Multistate Tax Comm'n, 434 U.S. 452, 493 (White, J., dissenting). The U.S. Steel majority may not have disputed Justice White's point, because the Court was focused mainly on whether the Compact created new powers for the States, not if it was simply a means of assuring that it could get the desired effect out of powers they already had. If Justice White's articulation of law is truly the standard, and not subsumed within the majority's new power analysis, then the NPVC might be evaluated differently. 142 Id. at 475-76. would follow, as such a decision would only serve to diminish political power of the state.
146
Simply put, the compacting state would not be able to get to the desired effect of a nationwide popular vote without assurance that enough other states making that additional change so that the new method of allocation would be controlling at the Electoral College. 147 155 Hendricks, supra note 146 (explaining that NPVC member states "want to pledge their votes not to the winner within their own bloc but to the winner in the nation). 156 Id.
157
Cf. Muller, supra note 83, at 232 (explaining that the NPVC shifts power to the signatory states because "it is the political power for a group of states to decide how electors should be appointed, as a collective group, to the exclusion of non-compacting states.") satisfaction of non-member state legislatures with the end product. 159 In fact, the NPVC acknowledges and preserves the significance of individual state elections because the actual maintenance of them is crucial in giving effect to the NPVC's aims.
160
A signatory state undoubtedly has the power to bind itself to a particular method of ] property rule approach would better serve the federalism values of local autonomy (locating decisional authority at the local level), interjurisdictional innovation (allowing for the diversity of response that engenders the federalism "laboratory of ideas"), and problem-solving synergy (fostering intergovernmental partnerships to cope with interjurisdictional problems))." See also Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991) (explaining how the federalism allows for greater government responsiveness).
198 See Ryan, supra note 197, [13] [14] acquiescence. 201 More to the point, the Court explained that the New York state government could not consent to congressional enlargement of power because the federal structure set up by Regardless of what analogy is applied to a state's plenary power, non-signatory states never had any power to choose electors other than that of their own state and cannot claim that the NPVC has stripped them of any "property right" in their decision on how to allocate electors.
E. In the Alternative: Withdrawal Concerns and the Lack of a Binding Mechanism
In NPVC litigation, another heavily debated issue within the second prong of the U.S. College and its Meager Federalism, 88 MARQ. L. REV. 195, 225 (2004) . 210 Id. ("[The Electoral College] does not give states themselves any right to exercise independent sovereignty."). Bradley Smith thinks that "[t]he biggest federalism effect of the College may be simply to remind both candidates and voters of the role of states in our larger federal system." Bradley A. Smith, Vanity of Vanities: National Popular Vote and the Electoral College, 7 ELEC. L. J. 196, 206 (2008 235 Even if an elector were to be enjoined from voting for a particular candidate but did so anyway, the subsequent legal proceedings might affect that elector individually, yet still be of no consequence to the Electoral College. 236 The faithless elector could runaway with his vote even if the political party he was pledged to vote in accordance with sought to enjoin him.
A layer of delegates in-between the people and the actual casting of votes was initially viewed as both as important to both the preservation of the country's republican structure and the 232 Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S. 214, 228-231 (1952) . The Court had briefly mentioned the roles of electors 62 years earlier, but did not address the issue of an elector's obligation to the party he is pledged to. Fitzgerald v. Green, 134 U.S. 377, 379 (1890) ("The sole function of the presidential electors is to cast, certify, and transmit the vote of the state for president and vice-president of the nation."). 233 Ray, 343 U.S. at 252. See also id. at 233 (Jackson, J., dissenting) ("It may be admitted that this law does no more than to make a legal obligation of what has been a voluntary general practice.") 234 Id. at 231. 235 James C. Kirby, Jr., Limitations on the Power of State Legislatures over Presidential Elections, 27 L. & CONTEMP. PROBLEMS 495, 509 (1962) . 236 Id.
fear that the swaying power of educated men would result in the public making poor choices. Older cases seem to weigh a balancing of the mere formality proposition, but ultimately conclude that state law cannot fetter an elector's discretion to vote as he so chooses. 241 The problem is hardly a current one, and the diminished significance of electors was acknowledged not long after the introduction of political parties. 242 While often never considered by the voting public, the possibility and awareness of faithless electors is quite real. 243 254 National Popular Vote, supra note 7 ("The presidential elector certifying official of each member state shall certify the appointment in that official's own state of the elector slate nominated in that state in association with the national popular vote winner.") (emphasis added).
adherence to the NPVC and/or state enforcement statutes might present different questions either independent of the NPVC or determinative of the NPVC's constitutionality. 263 Under this "lack of a binding mechanism" argument, the strongest line of support for the NPVC is that while it is not airtight in all of the possible areas of constitutional analysis, it can survive on the grounds that it is not asking for its pledged electors to do anything more than they are constitutionally permitted (and, arguably, mandated) to do. As the Constitution is silent on the roles of the electors themselves, the precise moment that a transfer of power occurs under the second prong of the Compact Clause will not be clear until after a candidate has been officially elected.
264

V. Conclusion
The Compact Clause presents a number of hurdles for both supporters and detractors of the NPVC. The most difficult component of a Compact Clause inquiry is defining what power, if any, is being infringed on. 265 That exercise calls for the analysis of deep philosophical questions of the rights that come with state sovereignty, making it challenging to ascertain whether, or even if, the NPVC runs afoul of the many principles of federalism that have already been established. The irony of the NPVC debate is that when enacted, the NPVC would have little substantive change on the end result of who gets elected. 266 While the Compact Clause will likely be at the center of the debate if the constitutionality of the NPVC is ever presented to a 263 See BENNETT, supra note 47, at 115 ("Courts only grapple with interpretational problems after controversy has gelled and a lawsuit has been filed. In the case of a faithless electoral vote that seems to change the outcome of a presidential election, that will be awfully late in the game."). 264 See Muller, supra note 83. 265 See supra, Part IV.C-E.
266
While candidates might campaign differently with the enactment of the NPVC, the actual vote totals probably would not change significantly. See Brian P. Janiskee, "The Multiplier Effect," http://www.claremont.org/publications/pubid.376/pub_detail.asp (last visited Nov. 19, 2011 ) (explaining how the national vote usually tracks the Electoral College vote). court, the NPVC can pass constitutional muster even if it encroaches on the sovereignty of nonmember states. Because the role of electors has yet to be defined by a court, they retain independent withdrawal power on behalf of compacting states. Regardless of what comes of NPVC litigation, constitutional scrutiny of it is a healthy exercise for the country, allowing scholars to focus on the merits of arcane constitutional clauses, the role of electors, and the purposes of the Electoral College.
